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External Debt and Military Spending: the Case of Africa’s Conflict Countries 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the light of the exigency and apparent irrationality of war and, the fact that most Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPCs) in Africa are associated with prolonged conflicts, there is more than a 
suspicion that military spending contributes to the indebtedness of Africa’s conflict countries. We 
therefore model this suspected nexus and compute the impulse response functions to the shock in 
military spending and, particularly determine what precise time around war external debt 
accumulation is prevalent. We confirm a positive correlation between military spending and external 
debt for most of the conflict countries, with external debt increasing in response to a shock to military 
spending for all these countries. Using panel analysis, we find evidence of military expenditure’s 
upward pressure on external indebtedness during pre-war, war and post-war periods; interestingly, the 
post-war period registers the fastest rate of external debt accumulation than other relevant periods. 
Our results suggest that military spending can be an important and nuanced factor in designing 
external debt management policies for Africa’s conflict countries and their likes. 
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1 Introduction 
The literature on military spending mainly focuses on military spending effects on economic 
growth, starting from the seminal works of Benoit (1973, 1978). Few studies focus on the relationship 
between military spending and external debt. Upon examining this nexus, Brzoska (1983) found 
that military expenditure is an important component of external debt for many developing 
countries. Looney and Frederiksen (1986) posit that defence expenditures have a direct effect on 
a country’s external debt stock if the country is an arms importer that finances its imports by 
using external funds. Alternatively, if a country’s imports are financed by export earnings, 
resources that could have been put to better alternative uses are squandered on debt servicing 
instead; in other words, the effect here is indirect. This postulation is supported by Alami’s 
(2002) two interrelated but distinct channels that trace the debt-creating effects of military outlays 
– i.e., government balances and import bills, in his study of the relation between “military debts”1 
and external debts of Arab countries. Military commitments can contribute to increased internal 
deficits or create budgeting problems by displacing or affecting public spending on other items. 
This may, in turn, force a government to finance the resulting civilian commitment through 
external borrowing.  
Dunne et al (2004a) conducted a panel analysis, using a sample of small industrialising 
countries, to determine the economic effect of military spending on debt. They find that military 
expenditure has a positive impact on the share of external debt in GDP. Further, Dunne et al 
(2004b) evaluated the impact of military spending on the external debt of three South American 
countries: Argentina, Brazil and Chile. They found that military spending burden tended to 
increase debt in Chile but show no effect on the evolution of debt in Argentina and Brazil. 
Narayan and Smyth (2009) also document similar results upon using a panel of six Middle 
Eastern countries to examine the same nexus. 
                                                           
1
 Alami (2002) defines military debt as credits and loans specifically earmarked for military purposes.  
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Günlük-Senesen (2004a) focused on the relation between macroeconomic imbalances and 
defence expenditures. He argues that for countries where defence spending is regarded as 
inevitable, government budgets are planned accordingly, hence defence spending increases 
budget deficits. Since governments are usually reluctant or unable to raise additional tax income 
or reduce welfare expenditures, increased government debts lead to external indebtedness. In 
another study, Günlük-Senesen (2004b) argues there are three channels through which defence 
spending promotes external borrowing. First, defence burdens the total budget and, thus increases 
government borrowing requirements, which in turn is met either through domestic and/or foreign 
sources. Second, if a country is an arms importer and foreign exchange revenue falls short of the 
total import bill, then foreign borrowing is a most likely source of foreign exchange. Third, 
demand for foreign exchange may also be induced by indigenous arms production, a typical 
outcome in developing countries, where the foreign exchange is needed to import foreign inputs. 
For a set of starkly contrasting findings, Sezgin (2005), upon applying Engle-Granger 
methodology, finds that Turkey’s external debt is negatively affected by its military expenditure. 
Karagol (2005) also runs Granger causality test between external debt and defence expenditures for 
Turkey for the period 1979-2000 and, finds that there is a unidirectional short-run causal relation 
running from defence expenditures to external debt. A nuanced result emanates from a follow-up 
study by Karagol (2006) when he investigates the relation between external debt, defence 
expenditures and gross national product in Turkey; he finds that financing defence expenditures 
through internal and external indebtedness crowds out the private sector from profitable investment 
opportunities. This negatively affects economic growth via the investment channel. Karagol’s impulse 
response functions show a positive response of external debt to a positive shock to defence spending. 
Specifically, Wolde-Rufael (2009) finds that an increase of 1% in defence spending increases 
the stock of external debt by 1.5% in Ethiopia. Their result corroborates the finding by Narayan and 
Narayan (2008) for Fiji. Yet in a more recent causality test by Georgantopoulos and Tsamis (2011) for 
four emerging Northern Africa countries – i.e., Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco; these authors 
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find no causal link between military expenditure and external debt for Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, 
but record a unidirectional causality running from defence expenditures to external debt for Egypt. 
They conclude that this latter finding suggests defence spending can be used as a useful 
macroeconomic tool for adjusting external debt in Egypt. 
From the foregoing, there are several salient issues pointing to the need for further research in 
this area and how such research should be nuanced to provide less conflicting outcome. One, there are 
mixed results on the contribution of military spending to the indebtedness of countries, most are 
positive while others are either negative or have no effect. Two, the extant studies are largely 
empirical in nature, with very few modelling the economics that underline the suspected spending-
debt nexus. Three and importantly, there are no cross-country (with only one country-specific) studies 
that look at military spending-external debt nexus for Sub-Saharan African countries, many of which 
had been burdened spectacularly by external indebtedness. This study aims to fill the last two gaps by 
focusing on African countries that have at least experienced an episode of civil conflict. 
More specifically, our study differs from previous studies in four distinct ways. First, it 
explores the effect of military spending on external debt for African countries that have had episodes 
of civil strife. The assumption is that during the periods of civil strife, countries increase their 
purchase of military equipment; thus, this specific episode which is usually commonplace in the 
developing world bears investigation. The only study that has covered African countries, to our 
knowledge, is Looney (1990) who looked at military expenditures and economic performance of 
conflict and non-conflict countries. Second, our study is nuanced in a way that yields policy guide as 
to how best to mitigate the inevitable lingering costs of conflict, of which external indebtedness can 
be the most persistent if not effectively managed. The innovation here is that we determine the 
specific time period in which Africa’s conflict countries accumulate external debt the most; and if this 
time period is one that is amenable to relative control, then  prevention would certainly be better than 
cure in terms of the indebtedness problem.  
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Third, Looney used a panel data to estimate a simple empirical model. Our study differs from 
Looney’s study in the sense that we develop a DSGE model for the economy. In our model, we 
include military spending in the utility function, in line with Gong and Zou (2003) and, we also add 
military spending in the debt function. Our intuition is that military spending contributes to the 
external indebtedness of countries, particularly countries in conflict. By explicitly modelling this 
pertinent nexus, we are able to determine as well as trace the channels of the impact of military 
spending on macroeconomic variables, including external debt.  
Finally, we simulate the model in order to gauge the response of external debt and other 
macroeconomic variables to a shock in military spending. In computing the impulse response 
functions, we use Uhlig’s (1999) method of undetermined coefficients. This is an improvement on 
Karagol’s (2006) methodology where VAR was used to compute impulse response functions. To 
mention briefly, we find that military spending has a positive impact on the indebtedness of Africa’s 
conflict countries. Interestingly, military spending leads to a significant increase in external debt 
during all phases of the conflict – i.e., pre-war, war and post-war periods – with the most debt 
accumulation occurring during the post-conflict period.  
In the next section we highlight the cursory relationship between military spending and 
external debt for Africa’s conflict countries. In section 3 we develop the DSGE model and, we 
estimate the model in section 4. In section 5 we simulate the effect of a positive shock to military 
spending on the macro-economy. Section 6 assesses the period in which military spending contributes 
to external debt most markedly, and section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Military Spending and External Debt  
The cause of indebtedness of African countries has been a major issue of debate since the 
debt crisis of 1980 (for historical accounts, see Easterly, 2002; Muhanji and Ojah, 2011a&b among 
others). Most of these countries have weak economic structures that have led to aid dependency when 
financing budget deficits. However, the role of military spending in understanding the indebtedness of 
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conflict countries in Africa has received little attention. Though the percentage of military spending to 
GDP may seem small, the exigency that underline this kind of expenditure appears highly likely to 
contribute to the indebtedness of a country especially if the country runs a budget deficit and is forced 
to resort to foreign borrowing to finance its budget. The cursory relationship between external debt 
and military spending for select African conflict countries is shown in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 Here  
Figure 1 shows that military spending and external debt move in the same direction in 
Burundi, Uganda, Djibouti, Eritrea, Mali and Mozambique. This implies that as countries increase 
their military expenditure, external debt increases or vice-versa. For a country like Angola, external 
debt exhibits a lagged response to changes in military spending. Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Sudan 
exhibit a less than clear pattern of association between these variables. Yet the upshot of Figure 1 is 
that there is ample cursory evidence of correlation between military spending and external debt.  
 
3. The Model 
We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of military spending 
and external debt for a typical African country. The model is derived from first principles and 
describes a model economy in which agents (households, firms and/or government, financial 
intermediaries, etc) dynamically maximize their objectives (utility/profit) subject to their budget and 
resource constraints.  
3.1 Household’s Behavior 
The representative economy is populated by identical households. Households consume 
military goods as part of their overall consumption. The representative household’s intertemporal 
utility function is given by: 
   ,	 , 
         (1) 
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Where  is the discount factor. The utility function has three augments – domestic 
consumption ,  consumption imports 
 , and military expenditure 	 , over an infinite life horizon. 
Domestic consumption, consumption imports and military expenditure are positively related to utility. 
We follow Gong and Zou (2003) in assuming that military spending is positively related to utility by 
way of its impact on security.  
The instantaneous utility function is concave and twice differentiable. It is also separable in 
the consumption of domestic goods, merchandise imports and military spending. The utility function 
takes the following form: 
 , 
,	 =  +


 + 
 	
,		     (2) 
Where  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,    is inverse of the elasticity of 
consumption imports, ! is the inverse of the elasticity of military spending and "
  is the preference 
shock to military spending. Military spending shock is exogenously determined and follows an AR(1) 
process of the form "
 = #
"
$% + "
∗ ∙ 
Household’s capital stock is a function of the lagged capital stock and investment. It takes the form: 
 ( = )1 − ,-( + .)/
 /
⁄ -/
       (3) 
Where , is the depreciation rate; /
 is imported investments; ( is the capital stock and .)∙- is the 
installation cost of capital. It takes the form1
23 44$% 5
1 2 /
, where 6 is the investment adjustment cost 
parameter. 
Further, households hold their financial wealth in form of domestic bonds	7, capital stock ( 
and foreign debt		78. Their intertemporal budget constraint is given by: 
 
9
: −
;
: 7
8 + <=( − )1 − ,-( = > −  + )1 + ?- 9$%: − 1 + ?
8 − # ;: 7
8 −
@/
 − 1 23
4
4$% 5
1 2 /
 −	 − A − @
 	,       (4) 
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where, @ = ;:
B
:   is the real exchange rate,  is the nominal exchange rate, ? is the interest rate on 
domestic bonds,  ?8 is the interest rate on foreign debt, <=  is the price of capital, <8 is the price of 
imports, < is the price of domestic goods, and  	#  is the risk premium.   
3.2 Firm’s and/or Government’s Behaviour 
Households in this economy supply monopolistically competitive labour. We assume that 
their labour supply is perfectly inelastic and therefore it does not enter into the production function. 
We follow Shieh et al. (2002) and d’Agostino et al. (2011) in assuming that output is produced by the 
government and the private sector. The private sector produces output using private capital stock ( 
whilst government produces output using government spending. Government spending is further split 
into military spending 	 and non-military spending	A. The production function for this economy is 
therefore given as: 
 > = C(∝%	∝EA∝%∝E        (5) 
Where, > is the output, C is the technological progress, ∝ is the share of private capital stock in 
output, ∝F is the share of military spending in output and 1−∝−∝F is the share of non-military 
spending in output.  
First Order Conditions 
The maximization of the utility function (2) subject to the budget constraint (4) and the 
production function (5) by choosing a sequence G, 
 ,	 , 7 , 78 , ( , /
, AHI

 yield the following 
first order conditions: 
  − J = 0           (6) 
  
 − J@ = 0          (7) 
  	 + JLFC(M%	MEAM%ME − J = 0        (8) 
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 − N: +
ONP%
O:P% )1 + ?- = 0         (9) 
 J ;: −
ONP%;P%
O:P% 1 + ?
8 − # = 0        (10) 
 −J<= + )1 − ,-QJR + J ∝ C(∝%	∝EA∝%∝E = 0    (11) 
 −J@ − R11 J 3
4
4$% 5
1
+ QJR 34P%

4 5
1
= 0        (12) 
 −J + J)1−∝−∝F-C(∝%	∝EA∝%∝E = 0       (13) 
From equation (8), it follows that  JR = R ∙ 
Taking first-order Taylor expansion around the steady state, the Euler equations can be re-written as: 
?̃8 = ?̃ − Q∆̃R + #U          (14) 
Ṽ =  Ṽ
 −

 WU          (15) 
X̃
 = 1RF1QX̃R
 +

RF1 )? − QYR- −

RF1 WU +
R1
RF1 X̃
      (16) 
Z[	 	= ME	R 	\U +

R Ṽ
 −

R WU   LF > 0	.    (17) 
Equations 14 to 17 represent the uncovered interest parity condition, consumption based IS, 
investment function and military spending equation. Note that a tilde on a variable represents 
deviation from the steady state.  
3.3 Equilibrium in the goods market 
Per relevant literature, the traditional gun-butter trade-off claims that military spending is an 
unproductive expenditure whilst the Benoit hypothesis posits that military spending stimulates growth. 
In fact, the effect of military spending on economic growth is mixed.  Jonakin and Stephens (2004) 
assert that at relatively low levels of military spending, the supply and demand side effects can 
generate economic growth; this positive growth would turn negative beyond an inflexion point where 
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the opportunity costs of military spending rise dramatically. Karagol (2002), Dunne et al. (2004a and 
2004b), Yildirim and Sezgin (2002), among others, provide evidence that military expenditure 
improves economic growth. Conversely, Dunne and Mohammed (1995), Heo (1998), Dunne et al. 
(2002) and others, show that military spending retards growth. Therefore estimate equilibrium in the 
goods market, we utilize a simple Keynesian model of the form: 
\ = ϘṼ + ϘFX̃
 + Ϙ`Z[	 + ϘabU + ϘcU − ϘdṼ
 + "
 	     (18) 
In this equation, government spending is split into military spending and non military 
spending. Defence spending can either positively contribute to growth or they can deter growth. This 
is dependent on the parameter	Ϙ`.  If Ϙ` > 0, then the finding will support the Benoit hypothesis 
which posits that military spending stimulates economic growth. However, if Ϙ` < 0, the finding will 
support the traditional gun-butter trade-off which states that military spending deters economic 
growth.  
3.4 Evolution of External Debt 
The equation for foreign debt is similar to that of Muhanji and Ojah (2011a) except that we 
add military spending. Unlike Muhanji and Ojah (2011a) who assume that foreign debt is a balance 
between exports and imports, we assume that foreign debt is a balance between exports, consumption 
imports and government spending. We then split government spending into military spending and 
non-military spending. The attendant foreign debt equation is thus: 
78 = 1 + ?8 <878f% +	g
fE − hfij + 
	fk + Afl ,     (19) 
Log-linearizing Equation 19 around the deterministic steady state gives the following equation for 
foreign debt. 
mn8 = o?∗mn8 + oFṼ
 − o`U + oaZ[	 + ocbU + "
       (20) 
Equation (20) implies that an increase in military spending, non-military spending and consumption 
imports lead to an increase in foreign debt whilst an increase in exports leads to a reduction in foreign 
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debt. We add military spending shock to the debt function. The intuition is that a positive shock to 
military spending increases indebtedness of the country. 
3.5 Price Setting and the Behaviour of Monetary Authorities 
To determine inflation, we follow Muhanji and Ojah (2011a) in assuming that firms and 
workers make both forward and backward looking pricing decisions. The open economy hybrid New 
Keynesian inflation curve is thus2: 
YU = pҨYU + )1 − pҨ-YUR + ŧ\U + μWU,   ŧ > 0	r	0 ≤ Ҩp ≤ 1,  (21) 
The term ŧ\U implies that, at any time, there is an upward-sloping relationship between inflation and 
output gap.  The coefficient p measures the degree of wage indexation to the unexpected changes in 
prices. Equation (21) differs from the classical Phillips curve because inflation responds not only to 
fluctuations in output gap but also to fluctuations in the exchange rate.  It shows that monetary policy 
affects inflation through the effects of the lagged exchange rate on the real price of imported inputs.   
We also assume that the central bank in this economy does not control the world interest 
rates, but instead controls the monetary base as in McCallum (1994).  Given that the economy is 
characterized by falls in export prices, tax evasion and civil strife, all of which leaves the government 
with a large budget deficit, investors do not have confidence that the government will honour its 
debts.  Investors are therefore not willing to buy its bonds and so the Central Bank of this economy 
finances its current account balance through foreign borrowing and seignorage.  However, supply of 
money in this economy is driven by the output gap and the inflation gap according to Taylor (1993).  
In closing the model, we assume that money supply evolves according to the following monetary 
reaction function: 
Z[ = #
Z[ − )1 − #
- tßuYU − ßv\U + ßwWUx − ß∆u∆YU + ß∆v∆\U + "
, (22) 
                                                           
2
 See Muhanji and Ojah (2011a) for derivation of the inflation function. 
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where #
 is the degree of persistence of monetary smoothing, ßu and ßv represent the sensitivity of 
money supply to lagged inflation gap and lagged output gap, respectively and "
 represents money 
supply shock.  Money supply shock is exogenously determined and follows an AR(1) process of the 
form "
 = #
"
$% + "
∗ Equation (22) shows that monetary authorities adjust money supply in 
response to changes in inflation gap and output gap.  The monetary rule is that the central bank 
reduces money supply if inflation exceeds its target value and increases money supply when output 
falls below capacity. 
 
4. Estimation of the Model 
The model is estimated using the Maximum Likelihood method by applying the Kalman 
filter. The data is first detrended using the Hodrick Prescott Filter (hereafter HP Filter) before 
estimating the model. Data for the model are downloaded from the World Bank’s Global 
Development Indicators and World Development Indicators (WDI). The data used for military 
spending are downloaded from WDI even though it is the same data that is provided by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute. The data covers the period 1970-2010, though for most 
countries data for military spending covers 1988-2010. 
Attempts to estimate the investment function produced very large parameters. These parameters were 
therefore calibrated. The calibrated and estimated data for the model are presented in Table 1.   
Insert Table 1 here 
The results show that military spending has a positive and significant effect on GDP for Chad, 
Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan (per Ϙ` of Eqn. 18). These findings are in agreement with Keynesian 
economists who argue that higher military spending increases output. Conversely, military spending 
has a negative but insignificant effect on GDP for Burundi, Congo Democratic and Côte d’Ivoire. 
Non-military spending positively and significantly contribute to GDP for all countries except Chad 
and Côte d’Ivoire in which non-military spending has a negative and significant effect on GDP. 
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Exports positively and significantly contribute to GDP for all countries whilst imports negatively and 
significantly reduce GDP for all countries except for Chad, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan. For Chad, 
consumption imports positively and significantly add to GDP. Except for Chad and Sudan, all the 
other countries report a positive and significant relationship between imported investments and GDP.  
Regarding external debt, the results show that there are mixed findings for the contribution of 
military spending to external debt. Surprisingly, in Burkina Faso, Central Africa, and Sudan, military 
spending has a significant negative effect on external debt, suggesting that an increase in military 
spending reduces external debt in these countries. Burundi, Chad and Mali, military spending 
significantly increases external debt. The rest of the countries show a positive but insignificant effect 
of military spending on external debt. The effects of non-military spending on debt also yield mixed 
results. Non-military spending positively and significantly contribute to debt in Burkina Faso, 
Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire. It has a negative and significant effect on external debt in Chad, Ethiopia, 
Uganda and Sudan. Consumption imports and lagged external debt have a positive and significant 
effect on current debt for most of the sampled countries.  
The results for the inflation equation (Eq. 21) show that lagged inflation has a positive and 
significant effect on current inflation. Most countries have backward looking expectations. Output has 
a positive effect on inflation for most countries except Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia and Mali in 
which output has a negative and significant effect on inflation. 
Estimates of the military expenditure equation (i.e., Eqn. 17), show that there is a positive 
relationship between output and military spending for most countries except Burkina Faso, Burundi 
and Congo Democratic. Consumption imports also have a positive relationship with military spending 
for most countries except Burkina Faso, Central Africa, Congo democratic and Mali. The positive 
correlation between consumption imports and military spending suggests that consumption imports 
are complementary to military spending in these countries. Further, most countries, except Burkina 
Faso, Central Africa, Ethiopia and Sudan, record a positive correlation between exchange rate and 
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military spending. This positive correlation suggests that a depreciation of the exchange rate increases 
military spending. 
 
5. Shock to Military Spending  
To assess the response of pertinent macroeconomic variables to a shock in military spending, 
we use Uhlig’s (1999) method of undetermined coefficients. To solve the linear version of the model, 
we reduce the solution of the expectational difference equation to the solution of a matrix quadratic 
equation. The model has five equations with no expectations and two equations with expectations. We 
therefore solve it using the matrix quadratic equation. We define ℎ as a vector of endogenous state 
variables, z as a vector of other endogenous variables (i.e., jump variables) that depend on the values 
of the state variables and { as the vector of the stochastic shock.  The state variables naturally follow 
the ridge but the values of the other variables need to jump to get the system on the stable ridge (see 
McCandless, 2008; 104 for additional details on this behaviour). Let ℎ = |X̃
, YU} denote the vector 
of endogenous state variables, z = ~Ṽ
, \U , Z[,Z[	 , mn8 denote the vector of the jump variables and 
{ = ~#
	denote the stochastic shock.  Separating equations that include expectations from those 
that do not, the linear version of the model can be written as: 
0 = ℎ +ℎ + z + { ,                 (23) 
0 = Q|ℎR + ℎ +ℎ + zR + z+{R +{},             (24) 
{R = { + R									Q)R- = 0,                (25) 
where C is assumed to be of full rank and has a well-defined inverse and N has only stable 
eigenvalues.  We follow McCandless’ (2008) method in computing matrices A to N. We use variables 
dated 	r	 − 1 in deterministic equations and variables dated  + 1, 	r	 − 1 in equations 
involving expectations	Q|∙} (Matrices A to N can be provided on request). 
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The solution to this economy is a set of matrices P, Q, R and S, which describes the recursive 
equilibrium, and laws of motion so that the equilibrium described by these rules is stable.  The 
equilibrium laws of motion are represented by the following equations: 
ℎ = ℎ + { ,          (26) 
z = ℎ + { .         (27) 
Upon deriving the roots of the quadratic matrix equation, we prepare impulse response functions for a 
1% shock to military spending. We simulate the model using 50 time periods. The results are 
presented in Figure 2. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
The impulse response functions show that, for all sampled countries, external debt increases 
after a positive shock to military spending.  External debt increases by about 1% for most of the 
sampled countries. This finding is in line with Karagol (2006) who found that a 1 standard deviation 
(S.D) shock to military expenditure led to an increase in external debt for Turkey. They are also in 
line with the empirical findings by Wolde-Rufael (2009) who establish that a 1% increase in defence 
spending increases the stock of external debt by about 1.5% for Ethiopia. These results suggest that 
defence expenditures are a determining factor in the indebtedness of Africa’s conflict countries. 
Bearing in mind that the countries under study are arms importers, the total import payments could be 
financed by external funds. Consequently, external debt liabilities of these countries accumulate over 
time (Karagol, 2005; Narayan and Narayan, 2008). 
Imported investments and output increases after a positive shock to military spending. Apart 
from Congo Democratic in which imported investments increase by about 2% in response to a 
positive military spending shock, the rest of the countries report marginal increases in imported 
investments. For Chad, imported investments do not respond to a positive shock to military spending. 
The increase in output and investment after a positive military spending appear consistent with Zou’s 
(1995) argument that when foreign military threat rises, a country can react by reducing current 
consumption and increasing both investment and military spending in the short-run. This leads to both 
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higher capital stock and higher weapon stock, with the expanding capital stock yielding a growing 
output. The increase in output after a positive shock to military expenditure is also in line with 
Karagol’s (2006) empirical finding. 
Surprisingly, inflation falls after a positive shock to military spending in most of the sampled 
countries. Money supply also increases after a positive shock to military spending for most countries. 
The increase in money supply can be supported by the fact that defence spending presses on the total 
budget. Consequently, countries either finance their budget through seignorage, borrowing abroad or 
foreign exchange reserves. The net effect is an increase in money supply in the economy.  
 
6. Phases of the Conflict Period and Debt Accumulation  
To ascertain which phase of the conflict debt accumulation takes place and/or differentially 
so, we estimate a bivariate model of military spending and external debt. Initially we separate the data 
into two periods: pre-war period and combined war and post-war periods, respectively. Pre-war period 
covers 5 years before the conflict year and post-war period covers the conflict year and post conflict 
years. The combined periods covers 5 years. The relevant model takes the form: 
7 = p	 +  ,																																													 = 1, 2, 3, … ,     (28) 
where,  is the error term. Next, we augment Equation 28 with terms of trade (ToT). Recall that 
exports are generally used to repay external debt and therefore an improvement in ToT reduces 
external debt. This argument is in line with Muhanji and Ojah’s (2011b) finding that exports 
significantly reduce foreign debt whilst imports increase it for African countries. Thus, the second 
equation to be estimated takes the form: 
7 = p	 + pF +  .															 = 1, 2, 3, … ,     (29) 
To estimate Equations 28 and 29, we use the fixed effects panel data regression method. This 
choice is informed by the unbalanced nature of our panel data where the random effects method 
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would produce biased estimates. The results for the two pertinent equations are presented in Table 2. 
Model 1 shows the results for Eqn. 28 and Model 2 shows results for Eqn. 29.  
Insert Table 2 here   
The results for model 1 show that an increase in military spending leads to an increase in 
external debt during pre-war, war and post-war periods for Africa’s conflict countries. Specifically, 
during the pre-war period, a 1% increase in military spending leads to a 0.60% increase in external 
debt; and during war post-war periods it leads to increases in external debt of 0.51% and 0.72%, 
respectively. The magnitude of the increase in debt during post-war period is the highest, which 
suggests that countries borrow more externally to fund military expenditure post the conflict proper. 
There is therefore either a tendency of circumspection around avoiding perceived vulnerability or the 
tendency of benefiting arms merchants (largely government officials) in an attempt to entrench their 
vested interest. The policy upshot is that either of these possibilities must be checked if government is 
to avoid inadvertent external debt over-run. 
Results for Model 2 show that ToT insignificantly reduce external debt during the three 
conflict periods. Inclusion of ToT in the model yields a negative but insignificant coefficient for 
military spending during the war period but the positive effect of military spending on external debt 
during pre- and post-war periods remains robust to the inclusion of ToT. In fact, the result of Model 2 
reinforces the finding that, on average, military expenditure runs up the external debt the most during 
post-conflict periods. Specifically, a 1%  increase in military spending during pre-war and post-war 
periods lead to increases in external debt by about 0.30% and 0.79%, respectively. The increase in 
debt during post-war period is almost twice the increase during pre-war period3. 
 
7. Conclusion 
                                                           
3
 Note that given the smallness of our sample, our results should be interpreted with care. Further, the bivariate 
model may leave out some important variables that can lead to indebtedness of these countries, as evidenced in 
results of the structural model in section 3. 
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Using DSGE model, impulse response functions and panel analysis, we investigate the 
relationship between military spending and external debt in Africa’s conflict countries. We find that a 
correlation exists between military spending and the external debt of most of these countries. An 
impulse response analysis shows that a positive shock to military spending leads to an increase in the 
external debt of all sample countries. Importantly, we also document that military spending leads to a 
significant increase in external debt during all phases of the conflict period – pre-war, war and post-
war periods, with the most debt accumulation occurring during the post-conflict period. Overall, these 
results suggest that military spending can be considered, in a nuanced way, as an important factor in 
designing debt management policies for Africa’s conflict countries and their likes.  
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Table 1: Estimated and Calibrated Parameters 
Estimated 
Parameters 
Burkina Faso Burundi Central Africa Chad Congo 
Democratic Côte d’Ivoire Ethiopia Mali Uganda Sudan 
θ 0.3984 (0.3560) 
0.0826 
(2.4890)** 
-0.0133 
(-0.9660) 
0.1403 
(0.1587) 
1.6099 
(0.7081) 
0.0147 
(1.5374) 
0.3644 
(1.0388) 
-0.8591 
(-3.5289)*** 
0.7305 
(8.6664)*** 
-0.0020 
(-0.6188) 
σ -0.7798 (-9.1462)*** 
0.2104 
(2.5309)** 
-0.0861 
(-1.4511) 
0.2465 
(6.1626)*** 
-1.4530 
(-7.0885)*** 
0.0525 
(1.4305) 
1.6092 
(5.1893)*** 
-0.1050 
(-1.6619)* 
-0.0359 
(-0.9744) 
-0.0228 
(-0.7453) 
ω -5.6722 (-1.7918)* 
0.6793 
(2.1779)** 
-0.1572 
(-2.9187)*** 
0.7329 
(0.2216) 
-2.8314 
(-1.7351)* 
-0.2945 
(-3.4849)*** 
1.9211 
(1.7805)* 
1.0927 
(2.2133)** 
-0.0898 
(-2.3332)** 
-5.5570 
(-3.1884)*** 
LF 0.01 c -0.2396 (-1.1330) 
0.1918 
(0.5653) 0.03
c
 0.02c 0.6321 (1.4772) 
0.6925 
(0.5147) 
1.2325 
(2.1646)** 
0.0967 
(0.5226) 
-3.1252 
(-1.4147) 
o -0.1091 (-0.3024) 
0.6769 
(4.7607)*** 
0.3669 
(1.4888) 
0.1406 
(4.8715)*** 
0.8651 
(7.0328)*** 
0.0389 
(0.2381) 
0.3495 
(1.9053)* 
0.8597 
(8.0660)*** 
0.7088 
(9.6362)*** 
0.3080 
(2.3961)** 
oF 2.4722 (2.9589)*** 
0.0038 
(0.0292) 
0.2259 
(0.6592) 
0.1027 
(7.3922)*** 
1.2543 
(5.2767)*** 
0.1893 
(0.6508) 
0.4803 
(0.8440) 
0.1102 
(0.3966) 
1.6758 
(7.9487)*** 
1.0642 
(3.4267)*** 
o` -1.6021 (-3.0141)*** 
0.1822 
(1.5248) 
-0.6413 
(-2.2325)** 
0.0527 
(6.5457)*** 
-1.3219 
(-3.7091)*** 
0.4592 
(1.7143)* 
0.1913 
(0.4277) 
-0.0169 
(-0.0851) 
-0.0074 
(-0.0595) 
1.2564 
(4.4786)*** 
oa -0.9572 (-1.9837)** 
0.3893 
(1.9317)* 
-1.7297 
(-4.6807)*** 
0.0667 
(7.2739)*** 
0.0126 
(0.4223) 
0.0436 
(0.5162) 
-0.1772 
(-1.3999) 
1.2204 
(3.8725)*** 
0.1513 
(0.6509) 
-0.5956 
(-4.1441)*** 
oc 3.3668 (2.3926)** 
0.1228 
(1.7266)* 
0.0715 
(0.7640) 
-0.3276 
(-6.5116)*** 
0.2164 
(1.2376) 
0.3687 
(2.2035)** 
-0.4499 
(-1.8658)* 
0.0955 
(1.1739) 
-0.9222 
(-4.6793)*** 
-0.8528 
(-4.4674)*** 
Ϙ 0.6070 (8.1218)*** 
0.9227 
(4.0815)*** 
0.8013 
(9.8273)*** 
-0.1764 
(-1.2214) 
0.6813 
(2.6850)*** 
0.5650 
(3.3165)*** 
0.7837 
(21.8976)*** 
0.8599 
(8.6045)*** 
0.7489 
(10.8004)*** 
0.8153 
(8.7862)*** 
ϘF 0.2055 (4.7136)*** 
0.1092 
(4.3254)*** 
0.0989 
(12.7281)*** 
-0.1120 
(-2.2698)** 
0.1049 
(3.8907)*** 
0.1038 
(2.8268)*** 
0.1862 
(8.4796)*** 
0.2348 
(2.4851)** 
0.1310 
(2.0581)** 
0.0241 
(0.5004) 
Ϙ` 0.0397 (1.1504) 
-0.0196 
(-0.1933) 
0.0470 
(1.2562) 
0.0878 
(5.0612)*** 
-0.0038 
(-0.7109) 
-0.0474 
(-1.2797) 
0.0338 
(4.9543)*** 
0.0046 
(0.0833) 
0.1071 
(2.5884)** 
0.0512 
(2.0544)** 
Ϙa 0.2159 (2.2089)** 
0.1103 
(3.5481)*** 
0.0530 
(7.1872)*** 
-0.3003 
(-2.2045)** 
0.1704 
(1.7915)* 
-0.1596 
(-2.5291)** 
0.0842 
(7.9324)*** 
0.0651 
(2.1909)** 
0.1510 
(4.7691)*** 
0.0830 
(2.4926)** 
Ϙc  0.1001 (2.4401)** 
0.1066 
(3.0690)*** 
0.1323 
(5.5400)*** 
0.2937 
(9.1772)*** 
0.3777 
(8.4896)*** 
0.2457 
(2.7922)*** 
0.0425 
(1.9531)* 
0.1905 
(2.2220)** 
0.2101 
(9.8038)*** 
0.0842 
(2.4287)** 
The symbol c represents calibrated parameter. These are parameters that could not be estimated because they produced values that were too large. They were calibrated by 
taking the average value of the variable. The values in parenthesis are the Z- Values. The symbol ***, ** and * represent significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Continuation Table 1: Estimated and Calibrated Parameters 
Estimated 
Parameters Burkina Faso Burundi Central Africa Chad 
Congo 
Democratic Côte d’Ivoire Ethiopia Mali 
Uganda 
 
Sudan 
 
Ϙd  -0.1825 (-3.5445)*** 
-0.2541 
(-2.2921)** 
-0.1352 
(-4.1535)*** 
0.3075 
(2.7117)*** 
-0.3010 
(-4.0923)*** 
-0.0974 
(-0.6982) 
-0.1330 
(-6.4313)*** 
-0.3528 
(-2.1646)** 
-0.2002 
(-3.3155)*** 
-0.0358 
(-0.7419) 
κ 0.4420 (5.0266)*** 
0.5330 
(4.8263)*** 
0.3179 
(1.7266)* 
0.5148 
(4.2855)*** 
0.7768 
(8.2450)*** 
0.4105 
(5.4255)*** 
0.6155 
(3.8486)*** 
0.6208 
(3.5658)*** 
0.5160 
(5.0328)*** 
0.5290 
(6.3304)*** 
ŧ -16.4566 (-2.0472)** 
-3.1674 
(-1.9315)* 
7.8786 
(1.8674)* 
-3.3324 
(-0.7180) 
0.6650 
(0.6804) 
0.4096) 
(0.3138) 
-9.3553 
(-2.8461)*** 
-18.2334 
(-1.7163)* 
-1.2423 
(-1.2954) 
-0.5394 
(-0.9766) 
μ -0.2195 (-0.1477) 
0.0670 
(0.0507) 
2.5288 
(1.2161) 
-3.9592 
(-1.0702) 
-0.3427 
(-4.0200)*** 
-0.6917 
(-1.2176) 
1.0113 
(0.5118) 
1.4849 
(0.4713) 
-0.0187 
(-0.0600) 
-0.1420 
(-0.7543) 
#
 0.4697 (3.4935)*** 
0.0727 
(0.2939) 
0.1594 
(1.5573) 
0.3544 
(2.1001)** 
0.0588 
(0.9133) 
0.5611 
(2.6391)** 
0.6499 
(2.3018)** 
-0.0261 
(-0.0581) 
0.5739 
(4.0169)*** 
0.5797 
(3.4929)*** 
u  0.0208 
(0.8374) 
-0.0616 
(-1.3997) 
0.0256 
(3.1905)*** 
-0.0242 
(-3.0558)*** 
0.0109 
(0.3078) 
0.0126 
(0.2552) 
-0.0537 
(-2.4267)** 
-0.0116 
(-0.6386) 
-0.0618 
(-1.1580) 
-0.0751 
(-2.8630)*** 
v -0.6921 
(-0.9532) 
1.3865 
(6.5876)*** 
-0.5718 
(-1.3225) 
0.7638 
(2.0160)** 
1.0678 
(3.2931)*** 
1.1710 
(3.1931)*** 
0.1072 
(0.3636) 
2.9069 
(4.1787)*** 
1.2186 
(2.1154)** 
0.1168 
(0.4398) 
w  -0.1647 
(-2.9729)*** 
0.0214 
(0.1165) 
0.0293 
(0.2328) 
0.0338 
(0.1202) 
-0.0915 
(-1.9157)* 
-0.0170 
(-0.0785) 
-0.0515 
(-0.4498) 
0.2067 
(0.9404) 
-0.0592 
(-0.3178) 
-0.0795 
(-1.7646)* 
∆u 0.0128 
(0.1667) 
-0.0053 
(-0.1683) 
0.0253 
(3.6256)*** 
-0.0205 
(-5.0620)*** 
-0.0016 
(-0.0555) 
0.0055 
(0.3597) 
-0.0468 
(-3.1706)*** 
-0.0060 
(-0.4443) 
-0.0038 
(-0.4678) 
-0.0155 
(-0.4133) 
∆v 0.7292 
(2.5506)** 
0.9035 
(2.7001)*** 
-0.0032 
(-0.0114) 
0.0820 
(0.6345) 
0.2404 
(0.6466) 
1.2065 
(4.2000)*** 
0.0028 
(0.0096) 
1.9448 
(2.3698)** 
0.4895 
(2.4353)** 
0.4970 
(3.4351)*** 
Calibrated 
Parameter           
φ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
The symbol c represents calibrated parameter. These are parameters that could not be estimated because they produced parameters that were too large. They were calibrated by 
taking the average value of the variable. The values in parenthesis are the Z- Values. The symbol ***, ** and * represent significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 2: Military Spending and External Debt during Pre-war, War and Post-war periods  
Variables Model 1 
 Model 2 
Pre-War War Post-War Pre-War War Post-war 
Intercept  5.0512 
(4.60)*** 
 
5.6952 
(8.92)*** 
 
3.8222 
(1.44) 
 
7.4754 
(5.15)*** 
 
10.3592 
(16.20)*** 
 
3.2972 
(1.24) 
 
Lrmilexp  0.5963 
(4.44)*** 
 
0.5153 
(6.91)*** 
 
0.7185 
(2.35)** 
 
0.3091 
(1.74)* 
 
-0.0169 
(-0.23) 
 
0.7932 
(2.57)** 
 
ToT 
   
-0.0180 
(-0.21) 
-0.0428 
(-0.51) 
-0.0940 
(-1.31) 
    
   Observations 28 69 45 25 58 45 
Hausman Test   
    
Model 1 shows results for external debt and military spending during pre-war, war and post-war periods. Model 2 
shows results for external debt, military spending and terms of trade during pre-war, war and post-war period. 
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Figure 1: Military Spending/GDP and External Debt/GDP for Selected African Conflict Countries 
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Figure 1: Continuation 
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Figure 2: Persistent Shock to Military Spending 
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